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Macroprudential policy framework 
Christine Cumming
1 
I’d like to thank the conference organisers and our hosts at the Bank of Korea for the 
opportunity to participate in this excellent conference. As Governor Kim discussed at the 
conference start, the recent financial crisis presents an opportunity for us to deepen our 
understanding of the financial system’s dynamics and to reshape our thinking about financial 
stability policy. I am especially pleased that so many economists invited here are scholars 
early in their careers. The recent financial crisis and great recession, with the hardships they 
created, will undoubtedly shape the thinking of the economics profession for many decades 
to come, much as the Great Depression did. The contributions over the last two days are an 
important stimulus for advancing our thinking.  
Let me begin with the usual disclaimer: these are my own views, not those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
2 
I would like to make four points. My first is to offer a proposition: that financial instability is 
always and everywhere a credit phenomenon. It’s an analogy to the observation invaluable in 
central banking: that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. That 
observation clarified that monetary authorities have the power to influence inflation 
expectations and must exercise it, whatever the underlying source of inflation pressure. If 
financial instability is always a credit phenomenon (a proposition open to challenge, of 
course), it clarifies why central banks have a crucial role in ensuring financial stability and 
might help us focus on how we shape our role.  
A related proposition is that a “big” expansion of credit cannot occur without lowering credit 
standards. There may be some exceptions in economic history, such as the creation of the 
consumer credit market in the 1920s in the United States, a Pareto-improving financial 
innovation that created lending standards where none had existed before. Those instances 
are uncommon, however. 
To be systemic, the expansion of credit needs to be “big” relative to the size of the economy. 
The expansion often occurs as a sectoral phenomenon, one with a substantial direct or 
indirect impact on the real economy. That means that such expansions should be noticeable 
well in advance of the credit collapse we associate with financial instability. 
Finally, credit expansions need augmented sources of funding. I posit that such augmented 
funding must, like credit standards, go “downmarket”. That is, the augmented sources of 
funding are less stable through the financial cycle than traditional sources and more like the 
“hot money” that is traditionally of concern to bank supervisors. 
Are there exceptions to the proposition that financial instability is a credit phenomenon? The 
tech bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s was ostensibly an equity-driven cycle. A 
deeper look suggests that, in many ways, it too could be characterised as a credit bubble.  
Expansion in the tech sector was fuelled not by bank lending or bond issuance, but by equity 
issuance and trade credit, that is, lending by companies to their suppliers and customers. 
The recent movie “The Social Network” reminds us how in the 1990s equity investors were 
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willing to place money in companies that had negative income and no revenue. Trade credit 
from the largest tech companies funded corporate purchases of their products, the 
inventories of their distributors, and some producers of related products. The abrupt 
reduction of equity and trade credit funding when the tech bubble burst reinforces Professor 
Shin’s point in his opening remarks that categorising the liabilities of financial institutions into 
core and non-core is a key judgment in monitoring financial stability.  
My second point is that fostering good underwriting and preventing the erosion of 
underwriting standards is integral to preventing financial instability. Central banks and 
financial supervisors, with their knowledge and historical experience, can confidently make 
judgments about good underwriting, and therefore can and should promptly take action when 
they see underwriting standards weakening. In many ways, stemming the erosion of 
underwriting standards offers a concrete and solid foundation for action, relative to 
overcoming the well known analytical difficulty of identifying asset bubbles or the political 
difficulty of taking actions to moderate financial crises already in train. If we have lacked 
sufficient evidence about the cost of poor underwriting, we now have the bitter experience of 
the United States to illustrate the risk of severe recession that arises in such circumstances. 
Central bankers can similarly identify the dangers embedded in the structure of funding at 
financial institutions and here too can act with confidence when unstable sources of funding 
or non-core liabilities become too dominant in the overall liabilities of a financial institution.  
My third point is to endorse the need for a framework to think about managing systemic risk. 
As Governor Kim pointed out yesterday, a major challenge is to bring microprudential and 
macroprudential policy actions together in a common framework, with a clear understanding 
of how the policies interact. At this conference we’ve heard some exciting work that brings us 
closer to a framework, such as the paper by Domanski and Ng, and will hear David 
Longworth’s remarks on this panel. We may soon coalesce around some key elements of a 
framework.  
I would like to offer two concepts that might be useful in developing the framework. The first 
is a concept familiar in information security, defence in depth. Defence in depth rests on the 
belief that no single measure can protect an information technology network from intrusion; 
rather, a combination of measures is required. The multiple layers of protection trip up an 
intruder, slow it down, and increase the probability of detection.  
Defence in depth is feasible for central banks and supervisors, since our collective policy 
toolbox has many tools, as Governor Ingves said earlier today. I would view one key line of 
defence to be strong incentives for financial institutions to manage themselves well, such as 
a robust resolution regime for failing financial firms and public disclosure of financial 
statements and comprehensive, forward-looking risk accounting by financial firms. 
Microprudential activities include robust capital and liquidity regulation, with an emphasis on 
loss absorbency within the capital structure; and proactive examination activity at financial 
firms that assesses the underwriting quality, funding strategy, risk management processes, 
and the incentive structure of compensation. Further measures include macroprudential 
policies applied at a financial system-wide level, such as loan-to-value limits, targeted higher 
capital requirements, countercyclical loan loss reserves and the incorporation of stress 
testing into underwriting requirements (such as testing the robustness of foreign currency 
mortgage loans to foreign exchange rate changes at loan inception, as is required in Poland). 
Macroeconomic policy actions likely also have a role.  
Defence in depth may also involve an element of progressive escalation in the use of policy 
tools, for example, if concerns develop despite a sound first line of defence. The escalation 
could include targeted examinations of the activity with follow-up corrective supervisory 
programmes if needed, such as new supervisory standards, additional capital requirements 
or higher market margins or haircuts, among others. Additional escalation could involve 
compulsory corrective measures at firms, increased penalties and other restrictions, 
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The recent macroprudential policy actions taken by the Korean authorities to address the 
risks in certain large inflows of capital from abroad – through new limits on foreign exchange 
derivatives and a subsequent proposed levy on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities – can 
be seen as an example of escalation. Large capital inflows from abroad, especially short-
term borrowing by Korean institutions, created concerns about rapidly growing exposures to 
foreign exchange and maturity transformation in banking institutions. At the same time, the 
Bank of Korea escalated its macroeconomic response by tightening monetary policy.  
The second concept for consideration is an explicit incorporation of the life cycle that past 
credit overexpansion has tended to exhibit. The papers in the conference’s first session 
sought to detect the emergence of systemic risk. The authors were clearly disappointed that 
the measures of systemic risk that they had developed worked well in identifying the risk in 
2007 and in tracing its growth in 2008 and early 2009, but didn’t really signal the build-up of 
risk that occurred before 2007, when forestalling actions by supervisors may have been most 
powerful.  
More research illuminating the stages of the life cycle of a credit overexpansion would clearly 
contribute to developing good diagnostics of early-stage potential for systemic risk. 
Understanding those stages and the effectiveness of tools in the policy toolkit at each stage 
of the cycle are essential elements of a fully articulated financial stability policy framework.  
Taken together, the concepts of defence in depth and the life cycle of credit overexpansion 
can help more fully articulate a framework for financial stability policy. The goal, of course, is 
to forestall the development of the excessive credit expansion and reliance on unstable 
funding that characterise the run-up to a financial crisis. I believe this helps explain why the 
tools most frequently identified as “macroprudential” often are aimed at discouraging the 
erosion of underwriting standards or over-reliance on unstable funding. 
As Governor Kim stated, research on the combined impact of microprudential and 
macroprudential measures is essential to developing the financial stability framework. 
Understanding the interaction of micro- and macroprudential measures and their calibration 
would represent an important breakthrough in the analysis of policies to manage system risk. 
The interesting empirical studies presented yesterday afternoon examined in a streamlined 
context the impact of combinations of microprudential and macroprudential measures both in 
the short run and in the medium term. This work has the potential to help policymakers 
address very practical policy questions. What measures work most effectively at different 
stages of credit overexpansion? How do we estimate Type 1 and Type 2 errors in the 
assessment of systemic risk and thereby understand the price of action in the application of 
micro- and macroprudential measures and the price of inaction? 
My fourth and final point is to highlight three key features of the recent US financial reform 
legislation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted in 
July  2010. It is a large, complex law, but the three features I will highlight are important 
innovations in the management of systemic risk in the United States.  
The first is the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC. It is chaired by 
the Secretary of the Treasury and its members include essentially all the principal 
US regulatory bodies. A large part of the FSOC’s work is to share knowledge across the 
regulatory bodies, identify emerging systemic risks and coordinate their efforts with respect 
to controlling major risks in the financial system. The regulatory powers of the constituent 
members of the FSOC are undiminished. The difference from the past is that the agencies 
have a forum to discuss emerging risks in the financial system and how best to address 
them.  
Domanski and Ng pointed out that the FSOC is large and the power decentralised among 
more agencies than the design of financial stability authority in many countries. A strength of 
the FSOC relative to the structure of the US financial system is that it provides broad 
coverage of the financial sector through its member agencies, with an ability to drill down in 
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macroprudential tools across the agencies, enabling the design of a defence in depth if one 
is deemed desirable.  
To realise the value of the FSOC, the members have been developing comprehensive 
surveillance of the financial system for emerging and incipient systemic risks. In that regard, I 
endorse Governor Ingves’ admonition to “follow the money”. The erosion of credit standards 
often occurs because the returns to a specific activity are so much higher than returns 
elsewhere in the market; the temptation to generate more business at those rates of return 
becomes irresistible. 
In addition, developing insights into emerging systemic risk requires a willingness to 
challenge conventional wisdom. Governor Kim noted that some of our most fundamental 
economic tenets about the efficiency of markets have been shaken by the financial crisis. In 
the economics profession, we need to take into account more fully that many models are 
observationally equivalent. Identifying and pursuing the alternative theoretical explanations 
for an observed pattern of data and drawing out the alternative implications could inject some 
healthy scepticism and richer analysis into policy papers.  
To realise the value of the FSOC structure, the leaders of the member agencies also need to 
have a “bias to action”. Once an emerging systemic risk has been identified, the regulatory 
authorities must be prepared to act – and must be willing to absorb the criticism they are 
likely to receive as they restrain activities with extraordinary returns. Certainly one lesson 
from the recent past is that the bias to inaction in the deregulatory decades before the 
financial crisis did not serve us well. And, within the FSOC, member agencies need to be 
willing to critique one another if the actions of individual agencies are insufficient.  
A second important feature of the Dodd-Frank Act is that it provides a key power to the 
FSOC, the power to designate systemically important financial institutions, most especially 
non-banks. The shadow banking system, long lauded for its contributions to innovation and 
dynamism in the US financial system, proved to be one of its most vulnerable aspects in the 
financial crisis. The propensity for substantial amounts of financial activity to take place in 
firms outside the core banking and securities sectors, beyond official oversight, sheltered 
poor risk judgments and controls, and more, from adequate scrutiny. 
Under Dodd-Frank, once a financial institution is designated systemically important, the 
financial institution is subject to the supervision of the Federal Reserve. That is, it is subject 
to the same supervisory regime as large banking companies. That ensures consolidated 
oversight of the financial institution’s activities, eliminates some potential for regulatory 
arbitrage, and potentially subjects the firm to an FDIC-managed resolution regime. The 
Dodd-Frank Act also provides the FSOC some capacity to designate activities as 
systemically important.  
A third important provision of the Dodd-Frank Act is the creation of the Office of Financial 
Research. The importance of that provision is easily underestimated. Its significance is 
threefold. First, it sponsors and conducts systemic risk analysis; eventually it will bring 
together analysts, academics and practitioners to provide analysis for the FSOC as well as 
fundamental research on systemic risk. Second, the OFR has very broad powers to collect 
financial data related to systemic risk, much greater than any regulatory agency in the United 
States. Third, the OFR has a mandate to achieve standardisation of data at the transaction 
level.  
This last is especially important. A significant problem for risk managers, supervisors, 
securities analysts and counterparties is the lack of standardisation of the elements of 
transaction data. This often makes it impossible to compare or aggregate data across 
financial firms, and in not a few cases, where information systems are inadequate, even 
within firms. The lack of detailed information about individual financial institutions and 
transaction flows and the difficulty of comparison are impediments not only to market 
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is assessing financial counterparties or assessing how the firm is positioned relative to others 
in the market. 
In a short contribution I made to the September 2010 Chicago Fed and IMF conference, I 
elaborate on this risk management point. The financial industry, and not just the financial 
authorities and the investing public, have a large stake in better, more comparable and more 
usable financial information. The excellent research on systemic risk done by Professor Shin, 
by my colleague Tobias Adrian, and by Princeton professor Marcus Brunnermeier, among 
others, provides a well-developed rationale why firms need greater information about the 
distribution of risk in the market in order to manage their own risk. 
Good data is essential for central banks and supervisors striving to maintain financial 
stability. A robust method of collecting, analysing, and assessing data, as well as methods 
for renewing data sources and developing new ones, is important given the pace with which 
changes occur in the financial system and with which problems develop. Governor Ingves 
talked about the run-up phase of the financial cycle of three to five years; I would note that 
the largest part of the subprime boom and its excesses took place in that time frame.  
As the OFR is established, a priority will be to reach out to the international community, 
especially as the OFR considers data standardisation. I believe we have a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity to do for financial market and institution data something similar to the 
development of the national accounts in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This is an 
opportunity that we should fully utilise.  
Thank you for your attention.  